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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze whether the current macroeconomic environment in India is suitable for 
implementation of inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy, in light of the recommendation 
of the Urjit Patel Committee Report. Our results indicate that historically the Reserve Bank of 
India has given more importance to inflation compared to output growth and exchange rate 
changes in its monetary policy conduct and that in recent times there has been an increased 
emphasis on monetary independence thereby comfortably placing the RBI on a path to move 
towards inflation targeting. However we also find factors, that are traditionally outside the control 
of monetary policy, do exert a strong impact on aggregate prices in India thereby making the 
choice of nominal anchor a tricky one. Furthermore, the success of monetary policy in containing 
inflation is found to be crucially contingent on an appropriate fiscal policy as well.  
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1. Introduction 
In January 2014, the Expert Committee to Revise and Strengthen Monetary Policy Framework 
under the chairmanship of Dr. Urjit Patel (henceforth Urjit Patel Committee Report (UPCR)) made 
several important recommendations related to the conduct of monetary policy in India. These 
include (a) Using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation as the nominal anchor for monetary 
policy communication; (b) moving towards an inflation targeting regime over the next two years 
with a target of 4% within a band of ±2%; and (c) setting up a five member Monetary Policy 
Committee, which will be responsible for making policy decisions, and be held accountable in 
case of failure to meet the nominal target.  
 
In India, there has been a long-standing debate on the benefits and costs involved with a move 
towards inflation targeting. HPEC (2007), also known as Percy Mistry Committee Report, strongly 
advocated a move towards inflation-targeting pointing out associated benefits including fiscal 
stability and low output volatility. It also argued that an institutional commitment to predictable and 
low inflation would reduce risks from capital flight as value of the Rupee would be maintained in 
real terms and expectations about its future values would be stable. While it advocated the use of 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation as the nominal target, it pointed out the necessity to cease 
subsidization of key prices and intervention in the commodity markets through price measures. 
Similarly, Planning Commission (2011) argued for reorientation of monetary policy towards price 
stability or low and stable inflation, although the report does highlight the deflationary cost 
associated with bringing down inflation from high levels and to build credibility for a central bank 
that has lacked inflation fighting credentials. Shah (2014) argues that every currency needs a 
nominal anchor as otherwise a country might end up printing too much ‘fiat money’, and that a 
foreign currency and CPI basket are the possible choices for nominal anchor. Of these, pegging 
to a foreign currency results in loss of monetary independence, and can lead to costly crises as 
witnessed in East Asia in 1997. In contrast, targeting inflation provides a durable long-term 
solution.  
 
In sharp contrast, Subbarao (2009) points out that “… inflation-targeting is neither desirable nor 
practical in India for a number of reasons.” These include (a) the need of a central bank of a 
developing country being guided by price stability, financial stability and growth; (b) food items 
continue to be vulnerable to supply shocks, especially because of vagaries of monsoon, and are 
beyond the ambit of monetary policy; (c) inefficient transmission mechanism due to large fiscal 
deficits, presence of administered prices and interest rates and illiquid private bond market; and 
(d) managing volatility of exchange rate in the face of disorderly capital flows.  
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In the aftermath of the UPCR, a number of articles have questioned the desirability and efficacy 
of inflation targeting in India. Nachane (2014) argues that inflation targeting regime, with an 
overwhelming desire to manage inflation, could have an adverse effect on a number of macro 
financial variables including exchange rate management, fiscal policy and financial stability.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the main recommendations of 
the Urjit Patel Committee Report. In Section 3 we evaluate whether India is indeed amenable to 
the implementation of an inflation targeting (IT) regime by estimating a Taylor Rule for India. 
Section 4 highlights some of the key issues that policymakers will have to deal with if India moves 
on the path of inflation targeting regime. Finally Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main 
messages of the paper. 
 
 
2. Key Highlights of the UPCR 
The UPCR argues for the adoption of an inflation targeting regime, under which the objective is to 
achieve the inflation target on average over the business cycle. The report points out that by 
predominantly focusing on price stability, an inflation targeting regime anchors inflation 
expectations, improves overall macroeconomic stability, and enhances growth prospects in the 
medium run. At the same time, an inflation targeting regime allows the inflation to deviate from 
the target in the short run to accommodate growth concerns. 
 
The UPCR favours domestic inflation as the nominal anchor over other historically used 
measures such as the exchange rate and monetary aggregates. While using the former as the 
nominal anchor involves relinquishing monetary policy independence and makes the monetary 
policy framework susceptible to speculative attacks and currency crisis, the use of latter can be 
undermined by instability and loss of predictability of the demand for money, thereby discrediting 
accountability and communication when targets are missed. 
 
In contrast, using domestic inflation as the nominal anchor makes price stability the unambiguous 
and sustainable objective upon which the private sector can anchor future inflation expectations. 
It also has the advantage of being simple and easily communicable, and thereby well understood 
by the public. However, focusing exclusively on inflation also has its disadvantages. First, certain 
components of inflation such as food and fuel cannot be directly controlled by the monetary 
policy. Second, the long and variable lags in monetary policy transmission makes targeting 
inflation a medium term approach. Finally, overarching emphasis on achieving the targeted 
inflation can adversely impact growth and employment prospects. 
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The UPCR favours the use of the all India Consumer Price Index Combined inflation against the 
traditional Wholesale Price Index (WPI) inflation as the inflation metric. This is primarily driven by 
the CPI Combined index capturing price movements in service sectors, which accounts for nearly 
two-thirds of GDP. This index is also subject to marginal revisions, critical for policy formulations 
as large revisions result in uncertainty in the assessment of inflation conditions. Moreover, CPI 
Combined has the advantage of capturing more accurately the true inflation that the consumer 
faces in the retail market.  
 
On the choice of headline versus core inflation, UPCR shows a preference for headline inflation, 
including food and fuel inflation. The latter tends to have an important bearing on aggregate 
inflation expectations as it gets manifested in the inflation of other items with a lag. Moreover, 
UPCR also notes that shocks to food and fuel inflation have a larger and more persistent impact 
on inflation expectations compared to non-food inflation. At the same time, the construction of the 
consumption basket makes it difficult to completely isolate the impact of food and fuel inflation. 
Exclusion of food and fuel inflation results in discarding around 57 percent of the consumption 
basket. However, even with the exclusion of food and fuel inflation, other components of the 
consumption basket such as transport and communication are impacted by change in diesel and 
petrol prices, and further segregation is not possible as item level disaggregated price index is not 
available. For these reasons the UPCR focuses on CPI Combined inflation recognising that a part 
of the inflation would be outside the ambit of the monetary policy. 
 
In selecting a numerical target, the UPCR relies on both comparator emerging market economies 
as well as India’s historical experience. The literature points out that while in advanced 
economies an inflation rate of 1 percent to 3 percent is viewed as acceptable, in emerging 
markets, acceptable inflation rate tends to be around 4 percent to 5 percent. Using empirical 
methods, the report finds that during the period from 2003-04Q3 to 2006-07Q1, when India’s 
output gap was fairly close to zero, CPI inflation averaged 4 percent. Similarly using quarterly 
data from 1996-97 to 2012-13, the report finds CPI-Combined inflation of above 6.2 percent is 
inimical to growth. Based on this analysis, UPCR recommends that the nominal anchor should be 
set at 4 percent with a band of ±2 percent around it. The UPCR stipulates a period of two years to 
achieve the inflation target. This is based on the costs imposed by high inflation in the form of real 
effective exchange rate (REER) appreciation, high current account deficit, erosion of financial 
savings and resultant decline in financial saving and investment that hampers growth.  
 
The UPCR also lays down some of the key changes in the institutional framework required to 
undertake a successful transition to an inflation targeting regime. A key precondition is to follow a 
path of fiscal consolidation so that a loose fiscal policy does not impede the monetary 
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transmission. The report also recommends the elimination of various administered prices, wages 
and interest rates that hinder the smooth transmission of monetary policy.  
 
 
3. Taylor Rule Estimation 
In order to find out whether the macroeconomic environment in India is indeed ready for the 
implementation of an inflation targeting framework, it is also important to understand the relative 
weights placed by the RBI on varying policy objectives within the framework of a conventional 
monetary policy rule. The RBI has mostly followed a pragmatic approach towards monetary policy 
responding to the state of the economy in a seemingly discretionary manner best outlined by a 
former Deputy Governor of RBI as follows, “….the overall objective has had to be approached in 
a flexible and time variant manner with a continuous rebalancing of priority between growth and 
price stability, depending on underlying macroeconomic and financial conditions” (Mohan 2006). 
Since Indian monetary policy is conducted in a highly discretionary manner, and somewhat non-
transparently, our empirical analyses using past time-series data can provide important insights 
into the “revealed preferences” of the RBI. 
Theoretical studies that derive optimal monetary policy rules, and empirical studies that 
investigate their use in practice, are now commonplace in the literature (e.g. Taylor, 1993; 
Clarida, Gali, Gertler, 2000; Woodford, 2001). Taylor (1993) formulated a policy rule by which the 
U.S. Federal Reserve adjusts the policy rate in response to past inflation and output gap (actual 
less potential output). Many studies subsequently applied and developed this class of policy rule 
to examine the behavior of central banks in industrialized countries (e.g., Clarida et al., 2000), as 
well as to emerging economies. In what follows we investigate whether the RBI’s seemingly 
discretionary approach can in practice, be described by a Taylor-type rule in the same spirit as 
Hutchison, Sengupta and Singh (2010), Mohanty and Klau (2005) and Virmani (2004). 
 
3.1. Brief background of Indian Monetary Policy 
The monetary policy framework in India and the associated operating procedure have evolved 
over time. The structural reforms and financial liberalization of the 1990s marked a paradigm 
shift. Swings in capital flows and rising volatility of the exchange rate made it difficult to target 
monetary aggregates. Interest rates and the exchange rate began to be increasingly market 
determined. The RBI was able to move away from direct instruments to indirect market-based 
instruments in its liquidity management operations. By 1997, Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and 
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) were brought down. RBI broadly followed the monetary targeting 
rule from mid-1980s till around 1997-98. 
	   6	  
In April 1998, RBI adopted a ‘multiple indicator approach’ with greater emphasis on interest rate 
and exchange rate channels for monetary policy transmission, relative to quantity instruments. 
Under the multiple indicator approach, which is currently in use, a number of variables such as 
money, credit, output, merchandise trade, capital flows and fiscal situation as well as interest 
rates, rates of return in different financial markets, inflation rate and exchange rate are analyzed 
for drawing monetary policy inferences.  
The RBI also introduced the Interim Liquidity Adjustment Facility (ILAF) in April 1999, under which 
liquidity injection was done at the bank rate and liquidity absorption was through fixed reverse 
repo rate. The ILAF gradually transitioned into a full-fledged liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) that 
was operated through overnight fixed rate repo and reverse repo from November 2004 onwards. 
The LAF helped to develop interest rate as an instrument of monetary transmission. 
In the process, two major weaknesses were revealed in the functioning of monetary policy. First 
was lack of a single policy rate. The operating policy rate alternated between repo and reverse 
repo rates depending upon the prevailing liquidity condition. In a surplus liquidity condition, the 
operating policy rate was the reverse repo rate, while in a deficit liquidity situation it was the repo 
rate. Second was the lack of a firm corridor. The overnight interest rates dipped below the reverse 
repo rate in surplus conditions and rose above the repo rate in deficit conditions. Moreover, 
overnight call rates became unbounded under occasional liquidity stress. Thus, more often the 
overnight interest rate remained outside the corridor.  
In May 2011, the RBI announced a revised monetary policy operating procedure based on the 
recommendations of a committee constituted for the purpose. The new operating procedure 
retained the essential features of the LAF framework with a few key modifications. 
• First, the weighted average overnight call money rate was explicitly recognized as the 
operating target of monetary policy.  
• Second, the repo rate was made the only one independently varying policy rate.  
• Third, a new Marginal Standing Facility (MSF) was instituted under which scheduled 
commercial banks (SCBs) could borrow overnight at their discretion up to 1% of their 
respective NDTL (banks’ net demand and time liabilities) at 100 basis points above the 
repo rate.  
• Fourth, the revised corridor was defined with a fixed width of 200 basis points. The repo 
rate was placed in the middle of the corridor, with the reverse repo rate 100 basis points 
below it and the MSF rate 100 basis points above it.  
The new operating framework with the modified LAF presupposes the dominance of the interest 
rate channel of monetary transmission. This implies that once the RBI changes the policy repo 
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rate, it should immediately impact the overnight interest rate, which is the operational rate and 
then transmit through the term structure of interest rates as well as bank lending rates.  
 
3.2. Data and Empirical Methodology  
Against the above background we split our sample into sub-periods based on major changes in 
the monetary policy framework. We use quarterly data from 1990 to 2013 and estimate the Taylor 
rule for three separate windows: 1990Q1-1998Q1; 1998Q2-2004Q3 and 2004Q4-2013Q2. The 
break in 1998 reflects the adoption of the multiple indicator approach and the one in 2004 
coincides with implementation of the LAF. We first estimate a standard Taylor rule based on the 
hypothesis that the RBI reacts to both the output gap and inflation while setting the policy interest 
rate.2 We also augment the standard Taylor Rule by incorporating exchange rate change as a 
third objective, given its significance in previous work (Hutchison, Sengupta and Singh, 2010; 
Mohanty and Klau, 2005): 
 (1)
                                             
Where,  is the nominal interest rate, is the output gap (deviation of actual output from 
potential output),  is the inflation rate at time t (assuming a constant inflation target such that 
the target is subsumed in the constant term of the equation) and  is the first difference of the 
log of nominal exchange rate. According to the Taylor Rule, the estimated coefficients of equation 
(5), ,  and  should all have positive signs. The rule thus implies that interest rate should go 
up when actual output exceeds the potential output, when inflation goes up or when exchange 
rate depreciates. We estimate equation (5) for the three sub-sample periods mentioned above.  
For the empirical estimation, we use the overnight call or money market rate for the policy rate. 
As regards the potential output level, unlike developed countries, in India there are no official 
measures. We derive the output gap using the standard Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter for measuring 
trend output and taking the residual of HP filter. We use the Index of Industrial Production (IIP) as 
a measure of output.3 We calculate year-on-year inflation using percentage changes in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The Taylor rule is a well defined monetary policy rule that throws light on a central bank’s stance with regard to multiple 
objectives at the same time such as output gap, inflation rate and exchange rate and it also helps estimate the extent of 
persistence in the monetary policy. Hence, in order to assess the importance assigned by the RBI to inflation as 
compared to other objectives of monetary policy, we consider estimating the Taylor Rule an appropriate empirical 
mechanism.  
3 Ideally,  we could have liked to use GDP to calculate the output gap. However, we are constrained by the unavailability 
of quarterly data on GDP for India before 1996-97. Hence, we use quarterly data for IIP which is available from the start of 
our sample period; it reflects the movement in the industrial sector, which accounts for 25% to 30% of the Indian 
economy. 
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Wholesale Price Index (WPI) as well as the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPI-
IW) given that the latter has received significant policy attention in recent times especially in light 
of the UPCR.  
Prior to estimations, we conduct unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, Elliott-
Rothenberg-Stock and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin tests) and results suggest presence of 
unit root in the exchange rate series in levels, but we find that the first difference of the series is 
stationary. Accordingly, we use first difference of the nominal exchange rate as specified in 
equation (5) above. We also run the Durbin Watson and Breusch-Godfrey tests that reveal the 
presence of serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test that shows presence 
of heteroskedasticity in error terms. Accordingly, we estimate our baseline model given in 
equation (5) using ordinary least squares regression with Newey-West variance-covariance 
matrix, in order to correct for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. We have also de-
seasonalized the series using the Census X12 procedure.  
Figure 1: Relationship between Interest Rate and Key Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Source: Database on Indian Economy and Authors’ Calculations 
The Woodford (2001) version of the Taylor Rule for an open economy expresses the policy 
interest rate as a function of the output gap, inflation target, the exchange rate and lagged interest 
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rate. Hence we further augment equation (1) by adding lagged interest rate in order to capture 
inertial in optimal monetary policy or interest rate persistence.  
   (2) 
This equation is also estimated for three sub-periods. Figure (1) above shows the evolution of the 
output gap, inflation (WPI and CPI), and nominal exchange rate series along with overnight 
interest rate during the sample period.  
 
3.3. Discussion of results  
The results of estimating equations (1) and (2) are given in Tables (1) and (2) respectively. The 
first three columns of Table (1) show the results for estimating equation (1) using WPI to measure 
inflation whereas the last three columns show results, with inflation calculated using CPI. 
Columns 1 and 4 truncate the sample at 1998Q1, and columns 2 and 5 truncate the sample at 
2004Q3. Each of these truncations represents a plausible break point from the perspective of 
changes in conduct of Indian monetary policy, as outlined in section 3.1 above. All the estimated 
coefficients whenever significant have the expected positive sign as predicted by theory implying 
that RBI has on average raised interest rate when output has been above its potential level or 
inflation has gone up or the nominal exchange rate change has been positive i.e. exchange rate 
has depreciated.  
Table (2) shows results for estimating the baseline Taylor Rule with lagged interest rate. Results 
are similar to Table (1) and we also find that interest rate has exhibited higher persistence in the 
final sub-period i.e. the inertia in monetary policy has been much higher in recent times.	  	  
It can be further seen from the table that output gap is statistically significant only during 1998Q2-
2004Q3 irrespective of the index used to measure inflation, implying that the RBI has not always 
been consistently responsive to output growth per se. The effective responsiveness to output gap 
depends on adjusting for the magnitude of lagged interest rate coefficient (Hutchison, Sengupta, 
Singh, 2010). Clearly the interest rate persistence does not seem to have affected output gap 
during the period 1998Q2-2004Q3 as shown the similar magnitude of raw coefficients of output 
gap across the two tables.  
WPI inflation seems to have been relatively important during the first and last sub-periods 
whereas CPI inflation has been consistently significant during 1990Q1-2004Q3 but not in the 
most recent period. The estimated coefficient of CPI inflation is greater than 1 in both Table 1 and 
and Table 2 (when adjusted for the lagged interest rate) for the period 1990Q1-1998Q1 indicating 
a strong policy response to inflation during the early years of the sample period. The magnitude 
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of the WPI inflation coefficient though close but never exceeds 1 even when adjusted for interest 
rate persistence. Thus, historically the central bank seems to have put greater emphasis on 
inflation rate compared to output gap.  
Table 1: Taylor Rule Estimation: Without Interest Rate Persistence 
 Using WPI Inflation Using CPI Inflation 
Variables 1990Q1 to 
1998Q1 
1998Q2 to 
2004Q3 
2004Q4 to 
2013Q2 
1990Q1 to 
1998Q1 
1998Q2 to 
2004Q3 
2004Q4 to 
2013Q2 
Output Gap 1.104 
(0.651) 
1.314*** 
(0.333) 
0.008 
(0.179) 
0.424 
(0.711) 
1.608*** 
(0.386) 
0.215 
(0.181) 
Inflation Rate 0.806*** 
(0.280) 
-0.221 
(0.291) 
0.452** 
(0.215) 
1.108*** 
(0.314) 
0.270** 
(0.097) 
-0.218 
(0.312) 
Change in Exchange Rate 34.957 
(23.715) 
9.177 
(26.406) 
6.703 
(21.604) 
36.171 
(24.447) 
-27.503 
(29.909) 
22.611 
(24.482) 
Constant 4.252 
(2.709) 
9.210*** 
(1.407) 
5.631*** 
(1.617) 
0.445 
(3.181) 
6.981*** 
(0.693) 
10.266*** 
(3.192) 
 0.327 0.372 0.073 0.364 0.448 0.046 
No. of Observations  32 26 35 32 26 35 
Note: Robust Newey West Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 2: Taylor Rule Estimation: With Interest Rate Persistence 
 Using WPI Inflation Using CPI Inflation 
Variables 1990Q1 to 
1998Q1 
1998Q2 to 
2004Q3 
2004Q4 to 
2013Q2 
1990Q1 to 
1998Q1 
1998Q2 to 
2004Q3 
2004Q4 to 
2013Q2 
Output Gap 0.801 
(0.567) 
1.328*** 
(0.372) 
0.121 
(0.172) 
0.288 
(0.597) 
1.641*** 
(0.439) 
0.288 
(0.186) 
Inflation Rate 0.636** 
(0.288) 
-0.229 
(0.308) 
0.365** 
(0.149) 
0.918** 
(0.371) 
0.276** 
(0.107) 
-0.160 
(0.186) 
Change in Exchange Rate 25.255 
(23.301) 
11.191 
(30.006) 
15.312 
(14.103) 
27.728 
(23.519) 
-24.800 
(30.125) 
28.100 
(18.711) 
Lagged Interest Rate 0.235 
(0.162) 
-0.024 
(0.173) 
0.413*** 
(0.110) 
0.198 
(0.180) 
-0.044 
(0.169) 
0.421*** 
(0.115) 
Constant 3.133 
(2.755) 
9,437*** 
(2.331) 
2.629** 
(1.014) 
0.118 
(2.913) 
7.309*** 
(1.477) 
6.161*** 
(2.200) 
 0.362 0.372 0.241 0.389 0.449 0.221 
No. of Observations  32 26 35 32 26 35 
Note: Robust Newey West Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Auhors’ calculations 
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However the magnitude of the inflation coefficients for both indices has dramatically gone down 
over the years—in fact for WPI inflation, both with and without interest rate persistence taken into 
account, the coefficients have almost halved between the first and last sub-periods. Also while 
WPI inflation is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level during 2004Q4-2013Q2, not 
only is CPI inflation not significant, its coefficient turns negative. A plausible reason for the 
insignificant coefficient on CPI inflation in the last sub-period could be the widening gap between 
CPI and WPI inflation, especially during the latter half of this sub-period, owing to a surge in food 
prices. Food inflation affects WPI and CPI inflation in a disproportionate manner due to the higher 
weight of food items in the CPI basket compared to the WPI basket. Another likely reason could 
be that the central bank was responding to the rise in inflation during the second half of the sub-
period only in an incremental and lagged manner. 
Going purely by WPI inflation, coefficient magnitudes and statistical significance, it seems that the 
though the relative importance assigned to inflation has diminished during the second sub-period 
(1998Q2-2004Q3), it has been somewhat recovered in recent times. If we consider CPI inflation 
however, the importance assigned to it seems to have declined over the sample period. Hence, 
when it comes to weight assigned by the RBI to inflation in monetary policy, clearly the index of 
measurement matters.  
We further find that in line with the RBI’s own policy stance, exchange rate movements do not 
constitute a systematically important determinant of its monetary policy conduct over the entire 
sample period-a result also consistent with earlier findings in Hutchison, Sengupta and Singh 
(2010). In none of the sub-periods do we find the estimated coefficients of exchange rate change 
to be statistically significant, irrespective of whether we take into account inertia in monetary 
policy.  
Overall, our results seem to indicate that inflation matters more than output gap if we are to use 
Taylor Rule to understand Indian monetary policy, there has been greater sensitivity to WPI 
inflation in recent times compared to CPI, exchange rate changes do not seem to play a crucial 
role and post-2004 conduct of monetary policy seems to have changed in the direction of greater 
inertia. 
A comparison of the interest rate predicted by specifications outlined in Table (2) with the actual 
interest rate yields interesting results. In the case of CPI inflation, during the period 1990Q1 to 
1998Q1, the Taylor Rule predicted rate was on average around 3 percentage points lower than 
the prevailing interest rates. During the second sub-period, we find that on average prevailing 
interest rates were in line with the rates predicted by the Taylor Rule. Finally, in the third sub-
period we find monetary policy to be tad loose with interest rates predicted by the Taylor Rule 
being around 1.5 percentage points higher than prevailing interest rates. 
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4. Issues under an Inflation Targeting Regime 
The move towards an inflation targeting regime marks a significant departure from the traditional 
multiple indicator approach.  This would entail the central bank confronting a number of issues. 
Below, we describe a few key challenges that the RBI would have to overcome as it moves 
towards an inflation targeting regime. These include (a) managing the impossible trinity; (b) 
deciding upon the inflation metric to use as a target; (c) determining the appropriateness of the 
numerical target; and (d) assessing the impact of fiscal dominance. We understand that this is not 
an exhaustive list of the challenges being faced by a central bank as it aims to undertake a 
transition to an inflation targeting regime.4 Mahajan et al.(2014)  highlight a number of other 
issues including absence of well-developed capital markets and accurate forecasting techniques. 
 
4.1 How to manage the impossible trinity?  
A fundamental contribution of the Mundell-Fleming framework is the impossible trinity, which 
states that a country may choose any two, but not all of the following three goals at the same 
time: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and capital account openness or financial 
integration (Aizenman, et al., 2008). Under this standard framework of the impossible trinity, given 
India’s enhanced integration with global capital markets, there would be a tension between 
monetary independence and exchange rate management.5 The adoption of an inflation targeting 
mechanism would result in the central bank relinquishing exchange rate management in favour of 
greater monetary independence. This could prove to be perilous given the sharp increase in 
volatility of capital flows in recent years. The central bank has grappled with the impossible trinity 
over the last several years. Below we use empirical methods to describe briefly India’s 
experience with impossible trinity using quarterly data from 2000 Q1 to 2013 Q4.6  
 
Monetary Independence (MI) 
Following Aizenman et al. (2010), the extent of monetary independence is measured as the 
inverse of the quarterly correlation of the interest rates between India and the US. The quarterly 
indices are calculated using weekly 3-month Treasury Bill yields for India and the US. The index 
of Monetary Independence is given by 
   
    (3) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For instance, in India the government bond market is much less developed compared to the same in OECD countries or 
for that matter other major emerging economies and the corporate bond market is even more illiquid-both of which pose 
significant constraints in an effective monetary transmission which in turn might hamper the successful implementation of 
an inflation targeting strategy. See Anand and Sengupta (2014), Banerji et. al (2012) and Mitra (2009) for a detailed 
discussion of the Indian corporate debt market. 
5 The Impossible Trinity or the Trilemma points out that that it is impossible to attain monetary policy independence, 
exchange rate stability and capital market integration simultaneously. Only two of the three objectives can be obtained at 
a particular point in time. 
6 For more details on construction of these indices please refer to Sen Gupta and Sengupta (2013) 
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where corr	   (iIND,iUS), refers to the correlation of the interest rates over a quarter and provides 
evidence on co-movement of domestic and foreign interest rates. A higher value of the index 
refers greater degree of monetary independence.  
 
Exchange Rate Stability (ERS) 
We use the methodology introduced by Frankel and Wei (1994) to create an index of exchange 
rate stability. The degree of influence that major global currencies have on Indian Rupee can be 
estimated using the following estimation model 
   
 (4) 
 
Where is the exchange rate of currency i against the numèraire currency, which in this case 
is the Swiss franc where currency i can be the US Dollar, Japanese Yen and the Euro. Under this 
estimation, which is the estimated coefficient on the rate at which currency i depreciates 
against the numèraire currency indicates the weight of currency i in the basket. In the case where 
the currency under observation is pegged to a particular currency or a basket of currency we will 
have or  for i currencies that are a part of the basket. Moreover, pegging to an 
individual or a basket of currencies implies a higher goodness of fit. We apply the estimation over 
a quarter and take the goodness of fit, or the adjusted R2 as the measure of exchange rate 
stability. A higher R2 indicates greater pegging to an individual or a basket of currencies.  
 
Capital Account Openness (KO) 
The index of capital account openness is based on a de facto measure of openness, as it is the 
actual volume of flows that creates a conflict between monetary independence and exchange rate 
stability as opposed to controls governing the movement of capital. The index of capital account 
openness, KO, is based on net capital flows, and is constructed as the ratio of absolute value of 
net capital flows to GDP.  
  
 (5)      
 
To make the indices comparable, all the indices are normalized to lie between 0 and 1.7  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The normalization was done by subtracting the minimum value of the series from the index and dividing it by the 
difference between the maximum and minimum values.  
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The validity of trilemma framework in India is estimated by testing whether the weighted sum of 
the three trilemma policy variables adds up to a constant – here set to be 2.8  
 
    (6) 
 
Using the methodology outlined in Bai and Perron (2003) to identify structural breaks, we find that 
the exchange rate regime in India can be classified into four distinct phases. These are: Phase I: 
2000 Q1 to 2005 Q3; Phase II: 2005 Q4 to 2008 Q3; Phase III: 2008 Q4 to 2011 Q3 and Phase 
IV 2011 Q3 to 2013 Q4. We find that the overall fit is extremely high with R2 being above 0.93 
across all the specifications, implying that the linear trilemma specification is a good 
approximation for India (Table (3)). While the estimates for exchange rate stability and capital 
account openness are significant across all the specifications, it is not the case with monetary 
independence.  
 
To obtain the weight assigned by the policymaker to the three different policy orientations of the 
trilemma we multiply the coefficients with the average for each phase (Table 4). The results are 
outlined in Figure 2.  
 
Table 3: Testing the Validity of the Trilemma Framework 
VARIABLES Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV 
Exchange Rate Stability 2.007** 2.013** 2.250** 3.357** 
 (0.046) (0.352) (0.683) (0.528) 
Monetary Independence 0.017 0.924+ 1.154+ 1.617** 
 (0.072) (0.452) (0.539) (0.391) 
Capital Account Openness 0.389* 0.210** 1.222** 2.089* 
 (0.191) (0.010) (0.234) (0.665) 
 0.997 0.955 0.957 0.966 
Number of Observations 23 12 12 9 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses  ***p<0.01, * *p<0.05,  *p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 If the Trilemma is indeed binding then a country, which chooses to implement any 2 of the 3 policy objectives perfectly 
will have to completely forego the third objective. Hence in our analysis where all the trilemma objectives are normalized 
to lie between 0 and 1, the maximum combined value of the Trilemma indices can be 2.  
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Table 4: Average Values of the Trilemma Indices 
VARIABLES Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV 
Exchange Rate Stability 0.947 0.638 0.371 0.154 
Monetary Independence 0.499 0.580 0.629 0.454 
Capital Account Openness 0.218 0.429 0.291 0.325 
 Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
It is clearly evident that across the phases there has been a decline in the weight assigned to 
exchange rate stability. In Phase I exchange rate stability was the overwhelmingly dominant 
objective of the policymakers. However, by Phase IV the weight assigned to this objective had 
dropped to a third of that in Phase I. The Rupee appreciated by nearly 17 percent between March 
2009 and April 2010. Similarly, between August 2011 and December 2011, the Rupee 
depreciated by 19 percent on the back of a widening current account deficit and weak capital 
inflows. The Rupee witnessed heightened volatility in 2013 as well. A high current account deficit 
and signals of tapering of the quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve in the USA resulted in 
the Rupee depreciating by 21 percent between May and August 2013. The various policy 
measures introduced to curb the current account deficit and enhance capital inflows helped the 
Rupee strengthen by 11 percent by November 2013.  
 
Figure 2: Contributions to Policy Trilemma 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
In contrast there has been a steady increase in both capital account openness and monetary 
independence. The rise in capital account openness has been driven by India’s increased 
integration with global capital markets. While gross capital flows as a percentage of GDP 
increased from 21 percent in 2000-01 to 52.1 percent in 2013-14, net capital flows rose from 1.9 
percent to 2.6 percent.  
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At the same time, the central bank pursued a more independent monetary policy. After the initial 
softening of monetary policy to stimulate growth, the RBI started tightening the monetary policy 
from March 2010 in response to high and persistent inflation. This was in contrast with the 
advanced economies, which were continuing to follow a soft monetary policy to stimulate growth. 
The increase in monetary independence in Phase II and Phase III is in line with the finding in 
Section 3.3 that interest rate was positively targeting WPI inflation rate during the period 2004 Q4 
to 2013 Q2.  
 
Given the overall shift in policy orientation with an increased emphasis on monetary 
independence along with a reduced focus on stabilizing the exchange rate, the RBI seems to be 
well placed to move towards inflation targeting. However, if the RBI wishes to proceed on this 
path it would have to relinquish its focus on ensuring orderly movement in the exchange rate. 
This would be in sharp contrast to some recent actions taken by the central bank. In mid-2013, 
the RBI mounted an interest rate defense as the Rupee depreciated by nearly 20 percent 
between April and August 2013. This was done by resetting overnight rates higher in order to 
increase the cost of carry for the rupee and thereby discourage speculation. This resulted in a 
sharp inversion of the yield curve with the short-term rate being more than 150 basis points 
higher than the long tenor government bonds. The hike in the short-term rates was also 
undertaken with a view to increase the relative interest rate differential with advanced economies, 
and stem debt outflows. 
 
Furthermore, a completely flexible exchange rate regime would prevent the central bank from 
shoring up reserves and restore reserve adequacy, which has deteriorated considerably in recent 
times. The import cover of reserves more than halved from around 15 months at the end of March 
2008 to 6.6 months at the end of September 2013. Over the same period the ratio of volatile 
capital flows (short-term debt and cumulative portfolio inflows) to reserves increased from 44.4 
percent to 97.3 percent. A bid to rebuild India’s reserves involves the central bank resisting 
appreciation of the currency by intervening substantially in the foreign exchange market during 
periods of capital inflow surge, as was done between January 2005 and April 2008, when RBI 
purchased $128 billion of foreign assets.  
 
4.2  Which inflation to target?  
The UPCR recognizes that some parts of inflation such as food and fuel inflation are not directly 
controlled by the monetary policy. This raises the questions about the appropriateness of 
targeting the headline inflation given that it is significantly less amenable to monetary policy 
actions (Mahajan et al., 2014). Furthermore, with an increase in the financialization of 
commodities through derivatives, headline inflation is likely to become more volatile.  
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In this section we use empirical tools to identify the main drivers of aggregate CPI inflation, and 
distinguish the roles played by the demand and supply side drivers. We use quarterly data from 
Q2 1996 to Q4 2013 i.e. a span of 71 quarters.  The choice of the initial period is driven by the 
availability of data, especially for quarterly GDP.  
 
The dependent variable is quarterly average of aggregate CPI inflation. This is based on taking 
the average of monthly CPI Industrial Worker (CPI-IW) inflation. The use of CPI-IW (base 
2000=100) inflation is necessitated by the limited availability of new CPI Combined inflation, 
which is available only from January 2012. CPI-IW inflation works as a good substitute given its 
high degree of co-movement with CPI-Combined inflation during January 2012 to December 
2013 (Figure (3)).  
 
 
Figure 3: Co-movement of Inflation Rates  
 
Source: Database on Indian Economy 
 
A number of factors have been found in the literature to influence inflation. Food prices are a 
major determinant of CPI inflation as food accounts for almost 50 percent of the CPI consumption 
basket, which implies a 4 percent increase in food prices has the potential to raise CPI inflation by 
200 basis points. This is significantly higher than most other large emerging markets such Brazil, 
China and South Africa. With agriculture output influencing food price movements, we use 
quarterly data on agriculture GDP to evaluate the role of food prices in influencing CPI inflation.  
 
Another major driver of inflation is fuel inflation. Assuming the cost of crude oil (Indian Basket) 
stabilizes around $105, the under recoveries of the oil market companies could be eliminated by 
2015 if the monthly diesel price hikes continue. The data on fuel inflation is taken from Fuel and 
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Light component of CPI-IW. Money supply is another major determinant of inflation. An increase 
in money supply in excess of economic growth could result in higher prices.  
 
We use the log values of CPI, agriculture GDP, money supply and CPI fuel after adjusting them 
for seasonal variation. Seasonal adjustment is done by using the X12 Seasonal Adjustment 
Program of the US Census. We find the presence of multiplicative seasonality in these variables. 
Next, we undertake the Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root tests for the aforementioned variables, 
and find that the variables are integrated of order 1 or are I(1). This implies that the variables are 
non-stationary in levels but stationary when first differences are taken.   
 
To capture the demand side pressures on inflation we focus on non-agricultural output gap in 
terms of growth rate. The output gap is computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Figure 4). If 
the economy is growing at a rate higher than the potential growth rate, the economy tends to 
overheat resulting in higher inflation. 
 
Figure 4: HP Filtered Quarterly GDP Growth Rate   
 
Source: Database on Indian Economy and Authors’ Calculation 
 
The nominal exchange rate also has an important bearing on CPI inflation. A weakening of the 
domestic currency can introduce inflationary pressures by raising the cost of imported goods. 
However, the exact extent of pass through depends on the pricing power of the firm, which has 
been curtailed to some extent in recent years due to weak demand. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Consumer Price Index Inflation 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant -0.146 0.103 0.030 -0.011 -0.146 
 (-0.764) (0.403) (0.136) (-0.048) (-0.609) 
Lagged CPI 0.859*** 0.923*** 0.9552*** 0.946*** 0.903*** 
 (58.740) (46.072) (37.196) (38.660) (27.908) 
Agriculture GDP -0.023 -0.012 -0.008 -0.008** -0.038** 
 (-0.626) (-0.279) (-1.199) (-1.972) (-1.974) 
Exchange Rate  0.027* 0.010 0.003* 0.039** 
  (1.756) (1.542) (1.815) (1.999) 
CPI Fuel   0.035* 0.030** 0.066*** 
   (-1.857) (-1.920) (-2.799) 
Non Agricultural Output Gap    0.0186** 0.020** 
    (1.985) (1.953) 
Broad Money Supply     0.035** 
     (2.452) 
R2 0.991 0.989 0.993 0.992 0.995 
Number of Observations 70 70 70 67 67 
Robust t statistics in parentheses  ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Source: Database on Indian Economy and Authors’ Calculation 
 
Data on CPI and CPI-Fuel are sourced from Labour Bureau, Government of India, while data on 
agriculture GDP and non-agricultural growth rate are obtained from Central Statistical 
Organisation. Finally, data on exchange rate and money supply is taken from Database on the 
Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India. 
 
We employ dynamic least squares estimation with lagged dependent variable to identify the key 
drivers of inflation. The results are reported in Table (5), where we incrementally add the impact 
of the various drivers. Not surprisingly, we find the lagged dependent variable to have a 
significant positive impact across all specifications, implying that price rise has been very 
persistent in India. Agriculture output negatively impacts inflation, but the effect is not significant 
across all specifications. In contrast, exchange rate, defined as the value of foreign currency in 
domestic currency has a positive significant impact on prices across most specifications. Thus an 
increase in exchange rate, i.e. a depreciation of the domestic currency, raises prices level.  
 
Both fuel prices and broad money supply also exert a positive significant impact on inflation 
across the various specifications. Finally, when we introduce non-agricultural output gap as a 
proxy for demand side pressures we find that it also have a positive significant impact on CPI 
inflation. In Figure 5, when we plot the actual path of CPI inflation with the inflation rate predicted 
by the regression specification outlined in Column (5) of Table (5), we find a close match between 
the two indicating our model is well specified.  
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Figure 5: Actual and Predicted Inflation Rate 
 
Source: Database on Indian Economy and Authors’ Calculation 
 
On balance, we find that factors, which are traditionally outside the control of monetary policy 
such as agriculture output, fuel inflation and exchange rate, do exert a strong impact on 
aggregate prices in India. To evaluate the extent of impact of the various variables on prices we 
focus on the specification outlined in Column (5) of Table (5).  We find that a 1 percent increase 
in agriculture output is associated with a 0.39 percent decline in prices, while a 1 percent 
depreciation results in 0.4 percent rise in aggregate prices. Fuel prices exert a strong impact on 
overall inflation with a 1 percent rise in fuel prices being associated with a 0.68 percent rise in 
aggregate prices. In contrast, a 1 percent increase in non-agricultural output growth results in 
prices increasing by 0.21 percent. Finally, an increase in money supply leads to prices rising by 
0.36 percent. While the above analysis is illustrative and sensitive to the specification chosen, it 
nevertheless points to the prominence of factors considered traditionally outside the control of 
monetary policy, for inflation in India. 
 
4.3  What should be the appropriate Numerical Inflation Target?  
The UPCR recommends a numerical target of 4 percent for CPI inflation with a band of ±2 
percent around it. This was driven by both domestic and international factors. On the domestic 
front, the UPCR argues that CPI-Combined inflation above 6.2 percent is inimical to growth. 
Furthermore, during the period Q4 2003 and Q2 2006, when the output gap was fairly close to 
zero, the average CPI inflation was around 4 percent. However, these estimates are sensitive to 
the period under consideration. A comparison with periods immediately before and after this 
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period shows that the period 2003Q4 to 2006Q2 was an unusually benign period for overall 
inflation, with the various drivers of inflation identified in Table (5), being particularly supportive 
during this period to achieve a moderate inflation.  
 
Table 6: Average Values of Key Macroeconomic Variables 
  Q2 1997 to Q3 2003 Q4 2003 to Q2 2006 Q3 2006 to Q4 2013 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Aggregate CPI Inflation 5.8% 4.2% 9.3% 
GDP Growth 5.4% 8.7% 7.4% 
Agriculture GDP Growth 1.3% 5.2% 3.7% 
CPI Fuel Inflation 10.2% 2.3% 8.2% 
Money Supply Growth 16.5% 15.6% 17.6% 
Exchange Rate Change -4.2% 2.1% -3.0% 
Non Agriculture GDP Growth 6.9% 9.7% 8.1% 
Number of Observations 26 11 30 
Source: Database on the Indian Economy and Authors’ Calculations 
 
As evident from Table (6), while agricultural output in Phase II, the period considered in UPCR, 
grew at a significantly higher rate than other phases, growth rate of CPI fuel inflation was 
significantly lower in Phase II. The domestic currency also strengthened in Phase II on the back 
of strong capital inflows, which was in contrast with the other two periods, when there was a 
sustained weakening of the Rupee. The growth rate in money supply was also more moderate in 
Phase II, despite it recording the highest GDP growth, and help in softening inflation. In contrast, 
the demand side pressures were higher in Phase II with non-agriculture GDP growth being the 
highest in Phase II.      
 
As pointed out in UPCR and also as documented in Table (6), Phase II was associated with an 
average aggregate inflation of around 4 percent. However, there has been a substantial change 
in the structure of the economy since then in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
externally, and a host of structural and regulatory bottlenecks stifling growth domestically. Thus, it 
becomes pertinent to evaluate the change in aggregate average inflation when the latter period is 
taken into account. Below, we extend the analysis presented in UPCR to 2013Q4. We use four 
alternative methods to calculate the gap between actual and potential output growth rate. Apart 
from the widely used Hodrick Prescott filter, which removes a smooth trend from a time series, we 
also compute the output gap using the Baxter-King filter. The latter is a bandpass filter, which 
allows suppression of both the low frequency trend components and the high frequency 
components in an economic series. The Christiano-Fitzgerald random walk filter improves over 
the Baxter-King filter in terms of an optimality criterion, and do not lose observation. Finally, the 
Butterworth square-wave high pass filter has the advantage of taking into account breaks in the 
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underlying trend of a series. Figure 7 traces the quarterly output gap calculated across the 
different filters and the corresponding inflation rates.  
 
Figure 7: Inflation and Output Gap across Different Filtering Techniques 
 
Source: Database on Indian Economy and Authors’ Calculation 
 
Table 7: Average CPI Inflation Rates and Output Gaps 
 Output Gap of ±2% Output Gap of ±1% Output Gap of ±0.5% 
Hodrick Prescott 7.8% 7.5% 7.7% 
 (34) (24) (12) 
Baxter King 7.4% 7.1% 7.0% 
 (29) (19) (8) 
Christiano Fitzgerald 7.7% 7.7% 8.0% 
 (34) (23) (11) 
Butterworth 8.0% 7.7% 7.4% 
 (37) (32) (27) 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis denote the number of quarters during which the output gap was within the prescribed 
range. 
Source: Database on Indian Economy and Authors’ Calculation 
 
In Table 7, we report the average inflation rates during the periods when the output gap was 
close to zero. In particular, we focus on three situations when the output gap lies within a 
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bandwidth of ±2 percent, ±1 percent and ±0.5 percent, and find that the average inflation rate 
ranges between 7.1 percent and 8.0 percent across the different filters and bandwidth. Thus, 
India’s recent experience shows that periods of small output gap were associated with inflation 
rates that were nearly twice than the final target set by the UCPR. Hence, without altering the 
structure of the economy by removing the structural and procedural bottlenecks that have stifled 
the supply response, reduction of inflation rate to around 4 percent through tightening of 
monetary policy, is likely to result in significant deflationary cost. Moreover, an unusually tight 
monetary policy could choke off the supply response that is required to alleviate some of the 
supply side bottlenecks that have been driving inflation.  
 
The UCPR recommends a glide path for the inflation rate, with the CPI inflation targeted to be 
down to 8 percent by January 2015 and 6 percent by January 2016, before formally adopting the 
4 percent inflation target with a band of ±2 percent. However, the glide path seems significantly 
steep seeking to reduce the inflation rate to almost half its existing level over a period of two 
years. This is in sharp contrast to how some of the other developing countries have proceeded in 
reaching the final target. For example, in Chile, after nearly a decade in which average inflation 
was around 21.5%, the authorities announced in September 1990 the first inflation target range 
between 15% to 20%, to be reached by December 1991. The initial goal was to converge to a 
single digit inflation, and once that was accomplished, the final goal was to achieve the level of 
inflation of developing countries. Thus, from 1991 onwards, each September, the central bank, 
announced the inflation target that was to be attained by December of subsequent year. Schmidt 
Habel and Tapia (2002) show that the central bank opted for a gradual approach to inflation 
stabilization by announcing a new inflation target each year, which was only moderately lower 
than the preceding one. Over the decade 1991 to 2001, the annual inflation target was lowered 
by 1.5 percent per year. It was only in 1999, when inflation has converged to low stationary levels 
and Chile had adopted an exchange rate float, Chile moved to a full-fledged inflation targeting 
regime with a range of 2% to 4% and central target value of 3%.  The gradualist approach was 
adopted considering significant backward indexation of inflation rate in Chile, which would have 
caused rapid disinflation to have significant output costs.  
 
Empirical studies estimating the New Keynesian Phillips Curve in India such as Mazumdar (2011) 
and Patra and Kapur (2010) find strong evidence for the backward-looking specification, with the 
coefficients on lagged inflation being positive and significant. Hence, a rapid disinflation through 
monetary tightening to achieve the inflation target in a short period of time is likely to entail heavy 
cost.  
 
4.4 How does the fiscal policy impact Inflation Targeting?  
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The extent of fiscal dominance plays an important role in determining the success of an inflation 
targeting regime. If the central bank is dominated to the extent that it has to purchase the bonds 
issued by the government or lend directly to finance the deficit, then the central bank will be 
unable to numerically target an inflation rate. In such a situation the central bank does not have 
any control over the size of its own balance sheet, and therefore will be unable to influence the 
policy interest rate in response to an excessively high or low inflation rate. In India, the 
monetization of fiscal deficits was first reduced and then eliminated in 1997, with government 
financing being done increasingly through debt auctions entailing the discovery of risk free 
interest rates in the economy. Subsequently, the central bank was prohibited from buying 
government securities in the primary market under the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management (FRBM) Act from April 2006. 
 
Blanchard (2004) and Favero and Giavazzi (2004) show that fiscal dominance can also result in 
unintended outcomes of monetary policy actions by altering the perception of the financial market 
about the ability of the government to honour its external obligations. Consider the case where 
the central bank has to raise interest rate in response to a demand shock with inflationary 
consequences. If the government’s debt obligations are short-term in nature, there could be 
concern in financial markets about debt sustainability which, in turn would widen the risk premium 
on the debt. This would likely lead to a weakening of the currency, which would further aggravate 
inflationary pressures, in contrast to the original objective of the central bank. Again, India is 
relatively well placed on this front as government’s external debt accounts for only 17.9 percent of 
the total external debt, and most of this is long term. 
 
Finally, fiscal dominance can have impact on monetary policy through its impact on aggregate 
demand and inflationary expectations. With a combined fiscal deficit of around 7 percent of GDP 
in 2014-15, fiscal dominance encroaches on monetary policy efficiency, as the central bank has 
to undertake open market operations to ‘manage yield’. Furthermore a rise in market borrowing 
by the government is associated with crowding out of private investment, which is reflected in a 
decline in the share of non-food credit.   
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Figure 8: Fiscal Deficit and Rule Based Targets 
 
Source: Kapur and Mohan (2014) and Authors’ Estimates 
 
Simone and Topalova (2009) argue that India’s experience with fiscal rules has been mixed. India 
introduced the FRBM Act in 2003 with the objective of eliminating revenue deficit by 2008-09 and 
reducing central government’s fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GDP by 2008-09. However, as shown 
in Figure 8, during the period 2004-05 to 2008-09, the actual deficit, including off-budget liabilities 
often exceeded the targets set by the FRBM Act as well as those outlined in the 12th Finance 
Commission. In fact, in 2008-09, official fiscal deficit at 6 percent of GDP was double the target 
set under the FRBM Act. Inclusion of off budget liabilities such as oil and fertilizer bonds 
amounted to an additional 2.2 percent of GDP in 2008-09.   
 
Part of the deterioration in fiscal deficit can be attributed to various fiscal stimulus measures to 
support growth in the aftermath of Global Financial Crisis. However, Simone and Topalova (2009) 
estimate these measures to account for only 0.6 percent of GDP. Even in the absence of these 
stimulus measures the fiscal deficit would have deteriorated considerably with the introduction of 
schemes such as agriculture loan waiver, expansion of National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme and implementation of Sixth Pay Commission recommendations, which hiked 
government employees’ salaries significantly. The surge in global commodity prices, and absence 
of expenditure reforms resulted in subsidies’ bill ballooning dramatically. These measures have 
resulted in the actual fiscal deficit breaching the target set by the 13th Finance Commission in 
recent years with the goal of achieving a fiscal deficit of 3 percent of GDP proving elusive. 
 
Below we estimate the impact of fiscal dominance on inflation following the vector auto regression 
(VAR) model outlined in Raj et al (2011). We employ a 4 variable VAR model with the variables 
being change in gross fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, inflation rate measured as the 
change in Wholesale Price Index and the policy rate. The policy rate is proxied by weighted 
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money market rate as it embraces the repo or reverse repo rate depending on the prevailing 
liquidity conditions. The final variable is the output gap, which is considered as a proxy for 
unemployment rate, as time series data on the latter is not available. 
 
Table 8: Test for Unit Root 
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillip Perron 
 Level First Difference Level First Difference 
Fiscal Deficit -10.164*** -12.593*** -16.204***   -28.083*** 
Output Gap -4.342*** -8.312*** -4.373** -8.505*** 
Inflation Rate -2.640* -4.550** -3.027** -4.424** 
Policy Rate -2.474 -7.229*** -2.459 -7.277*** 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Source: Database on Indian Economy and Authors’ Calculation 
 
Prior to conducting the VAR analysis we examine the stationarity properties of the key variables 
using the standard Augmented Dicky Fuller and Phillip-Perron tests. The results are highlighted in 
Table (8). Apart from the policy rate variable, all other variables are stationary in levels, while all 
variables are stationary in first difference.  
 
The optimal lag length of the VAR is selected as one based on various lag length selection 
criteria and the ordering of the variables are based on the Granger causality tests. We find that 
policy rate being influenced by other variables while fiscal deficit being least influenced. Figure 9 
highlights the impulse response functions as a result of a fiscal deficit shock.  
 
A unit positive shock to fiscal deficit immediately increases it and then converges to its long term 
equilibrium level after about five quarters. The fiscal stimulus raises the aggregate demand and 
has a positive impact on output gap in the next period, and the impact slowly dies down over the 
next seven quarters. The impact of the fiscal stimulus to output is evident only in the short run 
and could be attributed to the crowding out of private sector investment. An increase in output 
gap or an increase in output over its potential leads to a rise in inflation, which takes more than 
two years to subside. Finally, we find that monetary policy reacts with a lag and in a cyclical 
manner.  
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Figure 9: Impulse Response Function of a Fiscal Deficit Shock 
 
Source: Database on Indian Economy and Authors’ Calculation 
 
The forecast error-variance decomposition shows that shocks to fiscal deficit are important in 
explaining the volatility of inflation. These shocks explain about 18 percent of the variation in 
inflation after three quarters. Thus it is evident that expansionary fiscal policy by stimulating 
aggregate demand leads to a rise in price level in India. Hence, any success of the monetary 
policy in containing inflation would be crucially contingent on appropriate fiscal policy.   
 
The UPCR recommends reduction of the central government’s fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GDP 
by 2016-17. However, a couple of factors make achieving this target a challenging task. First, the 
recently introduced National Food Security Act (2013), aiming to provide subsidized foodgrains to 
nearly two-third of the population will entail significant fiscal cost. Gulati et al (2013) estimate the 
cost of this Act to be around Rs. 6821 billion over the next three years or an annual average of 
1.8 percent of GDP, assuming a nominal GDP growth of 13 percent. Second, additional fiscal 
pressures will also arise from the implementation of the recommendations Seventh Pay 
Commission, which will revise the salaries of the public sector employees. The implementation of 
the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission cost the exchequer around 0.7 percent of 
GDP in 2008-09.   
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper we evaluate India’s readiness to move towards an inflation targeting regime. An 
estimation of the Taylor Rule for India shows that historically the RBI has put higher emphasis on 
inflation rate compared to output gap and exchange rate. This along with RBI gaining greater 
monetary independence and allowing more exchange rate flexibility in recent years, places the 
central bank in a reasonably good position to initiate a move toward inflation targeting regime. 
However, a natural corollary of such a move would be the RBI not stemming volatile movements 
of the exchange rate and not being able to shore up reserves. Thus the benefits of lower inflation 
need to be balanced with the economic costs associated with exchange rate volatility and low 
level of reserves. Other concerns include the efficacy of using CPI inflation as the nominal anchor 
given that CPI inflation is much more sensitive to supply side pressures including agriculture 
output and fuel prices compared to demand side pressures, and monetary policy has limited 
bearing on the supply side drivers. This concern could get accentuated with a conservative 
choice of inflation target and band, relative to the structure of the Indian economy, achieving 
which might result in significant deflationary cost. Finally, high level of fiscal deficit continues to 
remain a strong bottleneck to the success of inflation targeting regime both by stimulating inflation 
and impeding monetary transmission.   
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